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Crime as tourism externality 
 
Bianca Biagi  
Claudio Detotto 




This paper analyses the linkage between tourism and crime with particular focus on 
the distortions generated onto criminal activities by the presence of visitors. 
Controlling for socio-demographic and economic variables, we empirically 
investigate the contribution of tourist arrivals to different types of crimes for 103 
Italian provinces and for the year 2005. Possible spill-over effects of crime are taken 
into account by testing two spatial models (one spatial lag model and one spatial 
error model). We also test the hypothesis according to which the different 
geography of tourist destinations - i.e. urban, mountain, marine etc- alters the impact 
of tourism on crime. Finally, we measure the social cost of crime associated with 
tourist arrivals.  
 
 
Keywords: Crime, tourism, spill-over effect, negative externality. 
 















In a tourist town in Italy, a professor of economics, his Belgian wife and their two 
children are walking. A motorbike with two local boys slowly approaches them; 
suddenly the guy sitting behind the driver tries to snatch the bag from the wife. The 
professor shouts - in Italian - to leave the wife's bag. The two boys surprised by his 
perfect pronunciation ask the professor where he comes from, the professor replies that 
he is Italian and lives in the town. The two thieves then return the bag to the professor 
apologising to him and his wife, saying that they mistook them for tourists.1 
 
In the last decades, tourism-led development has become one of the 
main goals in the agenda of several countries, mostly small regions, 
islands and developing countries with high level of tourism-based 
resources. The reason for this success is that tourism is one of the most 
dynamic industries in the world: in 1950 international tourist arrivals 
were about 25 million, in 1980 the number rises to 277 million, to 438 
million in 1990, to 684 million in 2000, and to 922 million in 2008 
(UNWTO, 2009). In 2008, tourism represented 6% of the world’s 
overall export of goods and services (about 30% of commercial services), 
and as “export” it ranks fourth after fuels, chemicals and automotive 
products (UNWTO, 2009, p.2).  
The academic literature finds exogenous and endogenous connections 
between tourism and GDP growth. Scholars following the export-led 
growth approach find empirical confirmation of the long term 
relationship between the two variables (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordà, 
2002 for Spain; Gunduz and Hatemi-J., 2005 for Turkey; Dritsakis, 2004 
and Katircioglu, 2009 for Greece; Ivanov and Webster, 2007 for Spain 
and Greece; Eugenio-Martin, 2004 for Latin American countries; Lee 
and Chang, 2008 for OECD e NON-OECD countries, de Mello-
Sampayo and de Sousa-Vale, 2010 for European countries). The linkage 
between tourism and GDP growth is found also by the application of 
endogenous models (Lanza and Pigliaru 2000; Brau, Lanza and Pigliaru, 
2007, both studies applied to a panel of countries; Soukiazis and 
Proença, 2008 for Portugal). 
While on one side tourism literature finds evidences on the positive role 
of tourism for economic growth, on the other side, it stresses the 
potential negative effects of a possible overproduction: in attractive 
locations, tourists and residents compete for the use of natural amenities 
                                                 
1 We thank the Italian Professor who, by telling us this real-life episode that 
occurred to him a couple of years ago, has inspired the topic of this paper. 
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along with a long list of public and private services, as a result, an 
unbalanced number of visitors may generate a switch of the virtuous 
economic cycle into a vicious one via the generation of many types of 
negative externalities. Shubert (2009, pp.3-4) lists the possible negative 
externalities that may arise from the presence of tourists “…crowding and 
congestion of roads, public transportation and cities, and thus conflicts between tourists 
and residents in using infrastructure, noise, litter, property destruction, pollution, 
increased water consumption per head, CO2 emissions, changes in community 
appearance, overbuilding, changes in the landscape and views, degradation of nature, e. 
g. caused by saturation of construction and development projects, depletion of wildlife, 
damage to cultural resources, land use loss, increased urbanization, and increased 
crime rate.”.  
Despite this long list, the majority of studies analyses the externalities 
looking at resources and environmental degradation (Budowski, 1976; 
Liu, Sheldon and Var, 1987; Dwyer and Forsyth, 1993; Chao, Hazari and 
Sgro, 2004; Cushman et al. 2004; Aguilò et al., 2005; Cerina, 2007) or at 
the change in the residents attitude towards tourism (Akis et al., 1996; 
Faulkner and Tideswell, 1997; Lindberg and Johnson, 1997, 1999; 
Haralambopoulos and Pizam, 1996; Figini et al., 2007).  
Little attention is given to the possible negative externalities arising from 
the increase of crime in tourist destinations. Ryan (1990) classifies five 
types of relationship between tourism and crime in destinations: type one, 
tourists are incidental victims and tourist presence is not the specific 
factor attracting crime; type two, crime activity is attracted by the nature of 
tourist location but the victims are both tourists and residents; type three, 
crime activity is attracted by the presence of tourists because they are 
easier victims than residents (the example quoted at the beginning of the 
section); type four, crime becomes organised to meet certain types of 
tourist demand, such as, for instance, the demand for illegal goods and 
services (drugs, prostitution, etc.); and finally, type five, tourists and tourist 
facilities are the specific targets of local terrorist action for political or 
religious reasons. 
Rather than investigating what type of relationship exists between 
tourism and crime, the present paper aims to determine the presence of 
any sort of connection between the two activities. Furthermore, it is 
essential to know which type of crime is mainly encouraged by the 
presence of tourists and also the social cost attached to this type of 
negative externality. Moreover, we analyse whether the incentive to 
criminal activity changes according to the geography of destinations 
(coastal location, mountain, or city art). The presence of local spillovers 
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is controlled by using spatial econometric tools. The empirical model is 
applied to a cross-section of Italian provinces (NUTS-III) for the year 
2005.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review; section 3 provides the data description; section 4 illustrates the 
empirical models; section 5 shows: the overall results (5.1), the results 
related to the geography of places and the calculation of the social costs 
associated to a marginal increase of tourists (5.2), and a sub-section 
dedicated to the robustness check of the models (5.3). Finally, section 6 
gives some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Literature review  
The relationship between tourism and crime has been studied from 
two opposite perspectives: 1. the negative impact of crime on tourist 
demand and on the economy of destinations; 2. the impact of tourism 
on crime. The former is included in the literature on the determinants of 
tourism demand (see Crouch, 1994).  In this context, Bloom (1996) 
studies the impact of local crime on tourism in South Africa; Levantis 
and Gani (2000) test the role played by crime on tourism demand of 
eight developing countries; Crotts (2003) analyses the trend of crime 
against tourists in Florida and explains how communities may contribute 
to the exposure of tourists to criminal activities. The attention on the 
role of crime as determinant of tourist demand has increased even more 
with the emergent phenomenon of political and religious instability that, 
in some extreme cases, has produced assaults against tourists and against 
tourist industries (Sonmez and Gaefe; 1998).  
The latter, on the contrary, is more related to the empirical literature on 
crime that, in turn, has as theoretical reference point the rational choice 
of crime à la Becker (1968).  
Few studies investigate how the tourist presence interferes with the 
incentive to committing criminal activity. For the case of Miami, 
McPheters and Stronge (1974) conclude that certain short term trends of 
crime are strictly connected to the cycle of the tourism industry. Jud 
(1975) investigating 32 Mexican States, finds that tourism affects many 
types of crime, such as, for instance: assaults, murders, frauds, rapes, 
larcenies, robberies, abductions, kidnappings.  
Using data on the State of Hawaii, Fujii and Mak (1980) observe a 
positive relation between tourism and the rise of crimes against persons 
and properties.  The case of the Caribbean Islands has been investigated 
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by De Albuquerque and McElroy (1999); their findings suggest that 
tourists rather than residents are more likely to be the victims of 
property crimes and robberies. On a similar line, Van Tran and Bridges 
(2009) using data from 46 European nations find that stronger tourism is 
linked to lower levels of crime against persons and higher rates of crimes 
against property.  
Studying the effects of tourist expenditure on crime activity in 50 US 
states, Pizam (1982) arrives to the opposite conclusion: tourism cannot 
be considered a significant determinant of crime when data are 
aggregated at a National level (p.10). This finding is consistent with the 
characteristic of tourism, more related to regional and sub-regional rather 
than national contexts. 
 
 
3. Data  
From an administrative point of view, Italy is divided into regions, 
provinces and municipalities. The Italian provinces correspond to the 
EU classification of NUTS 3. The number of provinces and 
municipalities has changed overtime; this work focuses on the 
classification used from 1992 until 20062 for which Italy is divided into 
103 provinces. As response variable, we test a number of crime offences: 
street crimes (pick-pocketing, bag-snatching and car thefts), extortion, 
fraud, murder, organized crime, prostitution, robbery, and theft in 
dwellings and shops. Data refer to the year 2005 and come from the 
Italian Ministry of the Interior. These figures have been further 
elaborated by adding to the recorded offences an estimation of the 
number of unreported crimes. In order to do so, we use the estimates of 
unreported crime rate elaborated for the year 2002 by the National 
Institute of Statistics (from now on ISTAT) for each macro-area (North; 
Centre; South). The information has been used to calculate the 
propensity “not to report” (α) and “to report” (β) crime for each macro-
area: 
 
Total crime = Reported crime + Unreported crime          (1) 
Total crime = α Reported crime            (2) 
Reported crime / Total crime = β                        (3) 
 
                                                 
2 The number of the provinces changed in 1971 (94); 1974 (95); 1992 (103); 
2006 (107). 
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As a consequence: 
 
α = 1/ β                         (4) 
 
Where α is propensity not to report and β is the propensity to report. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Table 1 highlights the propensity to report pick-pocketing, bag-
snatching, car thefts, robbery and theft in dwellings according to the 
location of the crime. Unfortunately, no data is available on extortion, 
fraud, organized crime, prostitution and theft in shops. For murder 
offences, 100% propensity to report is assumed.  
Contrary to expectations, Northern provinces do no exhibite a stronger 
attitude towards reporting. In a second stage, those results have been 
used to compute, when possible, the estimations of the real number of 
crime offences in each province.  
The explanatory variables are predetermined and divided into six main 
categories: 1. Economic; 2. Demographic; 3. Human Capital; 4. Deterrence; 5. 
Tourism, 6. Dummies. The Economic category includes value added per 
inhabitants (ValueAdded) and unemployment rate (Unemployment); the 
Demographic variables are the percentage of foreign residents (Foreigners) 
and population density per square kilometres (Density); the Human Capital 
is represented by the number of residents holding an Italian diploma per 
10,000 inhabitants (Diploma); Unknown is the ratio of crime events with 
unknown offenders over all recorded offences. Tourists variables are the 
total tourist arrivals per square kilometres (Tourists) and four 
multiplicative dummies to account for the type of tourism location: 
tourist arrivals per square kilometre in coastal provinces with small-
medium size cities3 (zero otherwise; Tourists_coast); tourist arrivals per 
square kilometre in mountain provinces with small-medium size cities 
(zero otherwise; Tourists_mount); tourist arrivals per kilometre in small- 
medium size city arts (zero otherwise; Tourists_cityart); tourist arrivals per 
square kilometre in provinces with big municipalities (zero otherwise; 
Tourist_bigmun); the dummies are two, South (value 1 if the province is 
                                                 
3 Small-medium size cities are provinces without any big municipality. As is 
specified in Table 2, for ISTAT big municipalities have more than 250,000 
inhabitants. Italy has 13 big municipalities: Turin, Genoa, Milan, Verona, 
Venice, Bulogne, Florence, Rome, Naples, Bari, Palermo, Messina, Catania. 
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located in the South of Italy) and Big municipalities (value 1 if the province 
contains a big municipality). Table 2 provides detailed information of the 
variables, while Table 3A and 3B illustrate some main descriptive 
statistics of dependent and explanatory variables, respectively.  
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
[TABLE 3A HERE] 
 
[TABLE 3B HERE] 
 
 
4. Empirical models 
 
4.1. The basic model 
Following the recent literature on empirical crime models, the paper 
proposes a cross-section analysis based on the Italian provinces. The 
purpose is to explore the determinants of crime including tourism and 
spatial spillovers of crime rates; hence, the first step starts with a cross-
sectional model (5) without spatial effect: 
 
Ci = β0 + β1 ValueAddedi + β2 Unemploymenti + β3 Foreignersi + β4 Densityi + 
β5 Diplomai + β6 Unkonwni + β7 Touristsi + β8 Southi + β9 BigMuni + εi                                                           
                                                                                                             (5)  
 
where Ci indicates the number of crime offences per 100 thousand 
inhabitants in the i-th province. 
Model (5) comprises a set of explanatory variables that are likely to be 
correlated with crime rates. Value added per capita is considered as an 
indicator of illegal income opportunities, we expect a positive link 
between the economic performance and the illegal activity. In the 
economic literature, the existence of a positive relationship between 
unemployment and crime is well known by now (Marselli and Vannini, 
2000; Detotto and Pulina, 2009). As Savona and Di Nicola (1996) 
highlight, the probability of illegal foreigners committing crime is much 
higher than that of the natives and regular migrants. Using a cross-
sectional analysis on Italian provinces, Cracolici and Uberti (2009) find 
that the presence of foreigners is positively correlated with murder, theft 
and fraud. The number of legal foreigners is used here as a proxy of the 
number of illegal migration. In this sense, we expect that the higher the 
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presence of regulars foreigners in the province, the higher the presence 
of illegal migrants. Density refers to the population per square kilometre; 
it is used as an indicator of urbanisation. As Jud (1975), the variable 
controls for the effect of density on crime (Jud uses the number of 
persons living in cities with a population of more than 2,500). We expect 
that the higher the level of population density, the higher the crime 
opportunities and, accordingly, crime rates. The level of human capital 
(Diploma) affects crime rates in several ways, for example, a higher level 
of education could indicate a higher level of social cohesion that leads to 
lower crime rates (Buonanno et al. 2009).  
The variable Unknown (as explained before, this is the ratio of the 
number of recorded offences committed by unknown offenders over the 
total crime recorded) is a proxy of the deterrence effect “stemming from 
the efficiency of criminal investigation of the local police and from their 
knowledge of the local environment” (Marselli and Vannini, 1997; p.96); 
the expected sign is positive, therefore, an increase in the share of 
unknown offenders, due to a lack of deterrence, leads to a crime rise. 
Tourists represents the novelty of the model (5); the variable is total 
tourist arrivals (nationals and foreigners) in the year 2005 per square 
kilometre. There are several reasons why a higher level of tourism might 
be related to a higher crime incidence; tourists generally take large 
amount of cash and personal valuables that could be easily sold off. 
Besides, they tend to be more careless and less suspicious when are on 
vacation. Finally, they tend not to report to the police. All these elements 
contribute to tourists being easier victims (Fujii and Mak, 1980). There 
are two different measurements of tourism flows in the literature: tourist 
arrivals and nights of stay. The former measures the number of persons 
arriving in a destination at a given time; the latter is the total number of 
tourists staying overnights at a given time. Tourist arrivals are an 
indicator of attractiveness of a given destination, while the nights of stays 
measure the economic relevance of the local tourist industry. The use of 
tourist arrivals, in spite of nights of stay, is not a novelty in the tourism-on-
crime literature (Jud, 1975; Van Tran and Bridges, 2009). The hypothesis 
here is the higher the level of tourist arrivals per kilometre, the higher the 
crime rates. 
In order to explore whether different types of tourism destinations such 
as art cities, mountain and coastal, produce different impacts on crime 
rates, a set of interaction variables are included in the basic model. Such 
variables are obtained by multiplying the explanatory variable Tourists 
with a set of geographic dummies (coast, mount and city art). In this 
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way, three new variables are obtained, namely Tourists_coast, 
Tourists_mount and Tourists_cityart. Somehow, the presence of big 
municipalities can drive the effects of these interaction variables giving 
spurious estimates; to avoid this problem, Tourists_coast, Tourists_mount and 
Tourists_cityart equal zero when a province contains a big municipality.  In 
order to further control for agglomeration and urbanisation we add also 
a mulitiplicative dummy for tourists in big municipalities (Tourist_bigmun).  
With the dummy variable South we control for the structural differences 
between the South and the rest of Italy. With BigMun (i.e. municipality 
with population exceeding 250,000 inhabitants) we expect big size towns 
to exhibit higher level of crime rate. 
Except for the binary variables South and BigMun, all variables are 




4.2 The spatial model  
Model (5) does not take into account spatial spillovers among the 
observations. In last decades this issue has become very relevant in 
regional economics, and many empirical works have shown the existence 
of this type of dependence among observations. 
Moreover, the presence of spatial dependence leads to unbiased but 
inefficient OLS coefficients (Anselin, 1988) due to the non diagonal 
structure of the disturbance term. To take into account spatial 
autocorrelation, a new model has to be implemented. The general spatial 
process is the following: 
 
y = ρW1y + Xβ + ε 
ε = λW2ε + µ                                                                                       (6) 
 
with µ ~ N(0, Ω). Wi are the spatial weighted matrices. For ρ = λ = 0, 
the model (6) represents the classical linear regression model with no 
spatial effects. For ρ = 0 and λ ≠ 0, we obtain the spatial error model. 
Imposing ρ ≠ 0 and λ = 0, the model (6) reduces to the spatial lag 
model.  
Finally, for ρ ≠ 0 and λ ≠ 0, we have the spatial lag model with a spatial 
autoregressive disturbance.  
The OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent for the parameters of the 
spatial model (6), hence the econometric literature suggests the 
maximum likelihood approach. 
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In general, the spatial models have many similarities to the time-series 
ones. The main difference between the two approaches is due to the 
nature (two-dimensional and multidirectional) of the dependence in 
spatial models. However, as in time series analysis, it is possible to 
express the spatial error model in terms of the spatial lag model using the 
Spatial Common Factor Approach: 
 
y = Xβ + (I – λW)-1µ                                                                           (7) 
 
After pre-multiplying both sides of the equation (7) by (I – λW), this can 
be expressed as in the Spatial Durbin approach: 
 
y = λWy + Xβ + WXγ + µ                                                                  (8) 
 
To be equivalent, the two specifications need to have γ = -λβ. The 
Common Factor Hypothesis (CFH) is based on the equivalence between 
the model with a spatially autoregressive error term and the spatial 
Durbin approach, and it corresponds to the test on the coefficient 
constraints of γ in the specification (8). The rejection of CFH is evidence 
in favour of the unrestricted model; conversely, its acceptance is 
evidence in favour of the spatial error model. In general, the test checks 
the robustness of the spatial error model (Anselin, 2003).  
Before the estimation of the spatial model, a spatial weighted matrix has 
to be designed. Unfortunately, there are a variety of approaches in spatial 
econometrics and it is not clear which of them should be used according 
to the different contexts. Moreover, the spatial weighted matrix not only 
has to reflect the scheme of the spatial effects between the units but also 
the magnitude of these effects according to Tobler’s (1970)4 first law of 
geography.  
In this study, a row-standardized contiguity matrix is used, where each 
element takes value wij=cij/∑cij if the provinces i and j share a border and 
zero otherwise. 
In the following section, the results of the basic model and the spatial 




                                                 
4 “Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant 
things” (Tobler, 1970, p.3). 
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5. Results  
5.1 Overall results 
The analysis is performed in three steps. Firstly, the OLS model (5) is 
estimated and tested also for spatial autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. In a second stage, the spatial lag model and the spatial 
error model are run and tested for goodness of fit. Finally, new controls 
are added to models (5) and (6) to check whether different crime 
incidence is observed in different types of destinations (such as coastal, 
mountain, and city art). This procedure is implemented for each crime 
type.  
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Table 4 compares the results of tourism coefficients among the crime 
offences under study. The first column displays the OLS coefficients. All 
coefficients are positive, but only one is statistically significant, although 
at 10% level. For all models with a significant Moran I test, both the 
spatial lag and spatial error model are estimated. As indicated in columns 
3 and 4, pick-pocketing is the only type of crime  that exhibits an evident 
tourism effect. As a consequence, from now on we focus only on this 
type of crime (see Figure 1 for a map of pick-pocketing in Italy).  
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
The first column of Table 5 shows the results of the OLS estimation of 
model (5). All parameters have the expected signs, although 
Unemployment, Diploma and Unknown are not statistically significant. Value 
added, Tourists and Density are significant and positive. Therefore, a 1% 
increase in tourist arrivals leads to an increase of 0.2% in pick-pocketing. 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
The adjusted R2 indicates a good overall fit (adj. R2 = 0.755). The 
diagnostic tests detect spatial autocorrelation (the Moran I test is high 
significant with a p-value of 5.895*10-4) and no heteroskedasticity (the 
Breusch-Pagan test is 0.09 with a p-value of 0.735). The performance of 
the heteroskedasticity test can be seriously affected by the presence of 
serial autocorrelation. As Anselin points out (1988), the serial 
autocorrelation in the residuals determines the upward bias of the test of 
heteroskedasticity, causing an over-rejection of the null hypothesis of 
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homoskedasticity. In our case, the Breusch-Pagan statistic test is 
sufficiently low and we do not need to implement a specific test for 
heteroskedasticity corrected for the presence of spatial autocorrelation. 
When the Moran I test is significant, the spatial econometric literature 
proposes the Langrage Multiplier (LM) test in order to find out which 
spatial model best fits the data. There are two variants of the LM test: 
the LM-lag and the LM-error test. The former tests the null hypothesis 
of no spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable. The latter tests 
the null hypothesis of no significant spatial error autocorrelation. In our 
case, both tests can be rejected with extremely low probability of having 
incurred in type I error.  
Then, the Robust Langrage Multiplier (RLM) tests are performed. The 
RLM-error test corrects for the presence of local spatial lag dependence, 
assuming the absence of this kind of autocorrelation, i.e. the null 
hypothesis is λ = 0. Similarly, the RLM-lag statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that ρ is zero, correcting for the presence of local spatial error 
dependence. Both RLM statistic are distributed as χ2(1). The RLM lag 
and the RLM error statistics are respectively 0.15 (i.e. p-value = 0.697) 
and 2.74 (i.e. p-value = 0.097). In order to test the robustness of the 
spatial error model, the Common Factor Hypothesis test is performed 
(CFH). The CFH statistic yields 2.984; the corresponding p-value is 
0.965. All results are coherent and show that the spatial error model 
performs better than the spatial lag model. 
The results of the spatial error model are presented in column (3) of 
Table 5. The λ coefficient is highly significant (value equal to 0.35). The  
Breusch-Pagan tests reported in the Table show that the problem of 
heteroskedasticity is not present either in the spatial lag model (p-value = 
0.17) or the spatial error model (p-value = 0.19). 
As before, Value added, Tourists, South and Density are significant (spatial 
error model, column 3).  The values of the spatial model coefficients are 
similar in magnitude to the ones of the OLS coefficients. Foreigners is 
weakly significant; a one percent increase in the share of foreigners 
would induce an increase in pick-pocketing of about 0.29%. Again, 
Tourists is positive and, on average, a 1% increase in tourist arrivals raises 
the level of pick-pocketing by 0.2% approximately. An increase in Density 
and Value added brings higher levels of street crime. The dummy variable 
South is negative: it catches the structural difference between the South 
and the rest of Italy. The descriptive analysis of pick-pocketing highlights 
how crime is a matter for which, on average, Central-Northern provinces 
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suffer the most (see again Figure 1). As expected, the dummy variable 
BigMun is positive as the big size cities experience a higher level of crime. 
Unemployment and Diploma variables are not significant, even if they have 
the expected signs. Those results are not a novelty in the economic 
literature on the determinants of crime in Italy (see, for an instance, 
Buonanno et al., 2009). 
From column 4 to column 9 two reduced form models are run in order 
to check the robustness of the estimates. In particular, in columns 7-8-9 
the model is limited only to the significant variable of solutions (1) - (3). 
The tourism variable is still highly significant, along with the other 
variables and controls, and positive in both spatial models.  
 
 
5.2 The geography of destinations and the social cost of tourism 
In order to control whether the geography of tourist destinations 
alters the impact of tourism on crime, we add three multiplicative 
dummies to the base model: Tourists_coast, Tourists_mount, and 
Tourists_cityart, the findings are presented in the first column of Table 6. 
The heteroskedasticity test is not significant and the p-value of the 
Moran I test is less than the one percent level. The two LM tests for 
spatial model are significant; in this case, RLM tests indicate that the 
spatial error model is the best, while the CFH test suggests the spatial lag 
model. However, the outputs of the two models are quite similar (see 
columns 2 and 3). Tourists_mount and Tourists_cityart are significant 
(although the former only at 10% level), while Tourists_coast is not. 
Notably, Tourists_mount and Tourists_cityart have an opposite impact on 
crime: the former is negative, while the latter is positive. 
 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
In columns 4-6, a new interaction variable (Tourists_bigmun) is included to 
capture the tourism effect in big size towns. The diagnostic tests suggest 
considering the spatial error model as the most robust. Surprisingly, 
Tourists_bigmun is significant (at the 10% level) and negative. However, by 
summing the coefficients of Tourists_bigmun and Tourists, we find that the 
effect of tourism in provinces with big size cities is insignificant. Hence, 
the marginal effect of tourism on crime rate seems to decrease with the 
size of destinations: in overcrowded large cities the negative effect of 
tourism is almost negligible. In general, the results suggest that tourist 
presence generates a relatively lower impact on crime in mountain 
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destinations and a higher impact in art cities: a 1% increase in mountain 
tourism causes pick-pocketing offences to increase by 0.152% with 
respect to the other locations [= 0.213% + (-0.061%)]; the same 
variation in the arrivals determines an increase of offences by 0.276% in 
art city  [= 0.213 + 0.063].  
A possible explanation of these results might depend on the geographical 
characteristics of different destinations. Mountain locations tend to be 
set in isolated clusters and, except for few “hot” spots, tourists are 
scattered along the territory, but even in the “hot” spots, the specific 
type of clothes worn in the mountains may reduce the likelihood to be 
victims of pick-pocketing. Furthermore, the physical conformation of 
mountain locations makes the escape harder for offenders. On the 
contrary, art city destinations are characterised by high density of tourists 
and residents, and for several periods of the year they are overcrowded. 
As a consequence, the high concentration of tourists fosters 
opportunities for crime and, accordingly, higher crime rates. 
Surprisingly, we observe that the marginal effect of tourism on crime rate 
is decreasing with respect to the size of the cities; hence, in big cities no 
tourism effect is found on the pick-pocketing rate. 
We now turn to calculating the social costs of pick-pocketing linked to 
an increase of the presence of tourists. The starting point is a recent 
study of Detotto and Vannini (2010) in which the authors measure the 
social costs of crime offences for a sub-set of crime types in Italy for 
2006. They find that the social costs exceed the Italian GDP by 2.6%. In 
the quoted work the social burden of pick-pocketing is calculated to be 
equal to € 124 million. Using the same estimates, we can calculate the 
marginal cost associated with an increase of pick-pocketing as a result of 
the rise of tourism arrivals: on average, at a national level, an increase in 
tourism arrivals by 1% should produce an increase in pick-pocketing in 
all provinces of 0.213%5 per year, which is equal to a social cost of 
264,120 euros (4.47 euros per 1,000 inhabitants). In art city destinations 
the effect is higher by 0.063%, (an average marginal cost of € 5.80 per 
1,000 inhabitants); while in mountain destination it is lower by 0.151% 





                                                 
5 Here we are referring to tourism coefficient of the spatial error model. 
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5.3 A robustness check  
Finally, in order to check the robustness of the previous results, we 
re-estimate the model (5) adding an interaction variable at a time. The 
results are presented in Table 7. Given the LRM tests and CFH tests, in 
all specifications the spatial error model is to be preferred. The λ 
coefficients are still positive and extremely significant. As before, 
Tourists_cityart is positive and highly significant at the 1% level (see 
column 3). Tourists_mount and Tourists_bigmun show a negative crime 
effect (in column 9 and 12, respectively), while Tourists_coast is not 
statistically different from zero (see column 6). 
 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
An important issue to check is the exogeneity between tourism and 
crime rate.  If tourism is not exogenous, we might expect that a shock in 
crime rate would impact tourism arrivals. In this case, our findings and 
the Langrage Multiplier tests for spatial error and lag dependence would 
be biased (Anselin, Varga and Acs, 2000; p. 506). In order to test the 
potential exogeneity of the tourism variable, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test is used (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993; pp. 237-242). In practice 
two OLS regressions are run. In the first regression, the variable 
suspected to be endogenous, namely tourism arrivals, is regressed on all 
exogenous variables and the instrument, and the residuals are retrieved; 
then in the second regression, the original (linear) model is re-estimated 
including the residuals from the first regression as additional regressors. 
Our goal is to identify an instrumental variable that is correlated with 
tourism variable but not with crime rate. Then, the following set of 
instrumental variables for tourism arrivals is considered: number of 
museums per province, proportion of the total sea area per province, 
and maximum altitude per province. Hence, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test is implemented. In the first stage, the identifying instrumental 
variables perform reasonably well, while in the second step, the 
coefficient on the first stage residuals is not significantly different from 
zero6. This result indicates that we could not reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of tourism variable. 
 
 
                                                 




The presence of tourists fosters criminal activities, but not all types of 
crimes are affected in the same way.  Like previous research on this 
topic, our findings suggest the existence of tourism effects on street 
crime, particularly, on pick-pocketing offences. More precise estimations 
have been obtained using spatial econometric tools.  
When we discriminate for the types of destination, we find that the 
impact of tourist arrivals on criminal activity is lower in mountain 
locations than in art cities. These results can be explained by geography: 
the different conformation of the territory may act as incentive or 
disincentive to commit crime, for instance, in mountain destinations the 
probability to escape is likely to be low while in cities is expected to be 
relatively higher. Further explanations are, for instance, the different 
“technology” of crime in different type of destinations, in art cities the 
concentration of “easier” locations for pick-pocketing is higher (buses, 
metro, etc) so that the “accumulated technology” of pick-pocketing 
industry might be higher as well. Probably, also the different types of 
clothing in mountain and in city may affect the likelihood to be the 
victim of pick-pocketing. 
In the final part of the work we calculate the social cost of tourism in 
terms of pick-pocketing. Of course, this measure is indicative of one 
type of negative externalities, in order to target proper policy 
interventions it is essential to measure also the cost of other negative 
externalities, along with the sources of positive externalities. Such cost-
benefit analysis is a necessary step to implement sustainable regional 
policies. However, this was beyond the scope of this paper, where the 
novelty was rather to investigate whether and how the positive impact of 
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Table 1. The propensity to report and NOT to report by type of 
robbery in the Italian for macro-areas. Year 2002. 
  Street crimes Thefts in dwelling 
  Pick-pocketing Bag-snatching  Car thefts   
PROPENSITY TO REPORT         
North 53.6 61.0 54.7 61.0 
Centre 58.4 67.0 56.4 63.5 
South 67.8 61.6 57.4 55.2 
PROPENSITY NOT TO REPORT         
North 46.4 39.0 45.3 39.0 
Centre 41.6 33.0 43.6 36.5 
South 32.2 38.4 42.6 44.8 























ValueAdded Value added per capita at a base prices - Year 2000 Economic ISTAT, Conti provinciali 
1995-2003 
Unemployment People looking for a job /labor force * 100 -  Year 2001  Economic ISTAT, Sistema di Indicatori 
Territoriali 
Foreigner Percentage of foreign people residing in the province- Year 2004 Demographic ISTAT, Atlante Statistico dei 
Comuni 
Density Density of population  per square kilometre - Year 2001 Demographic ISTAT, Atlante Statistico dei 
Comuni 
Diploma People with Italian diploma per 10.000 inhabitants - Year 2001 Human 
Capital 
ISTAT, Atlante Statistico dei 
Comuni 
Unknown Ratio of incidents with unknown offenders over the total 
recorded per crime typology  Year -2002 
Deterrence ISTAT, Statistiche Giudiziare 
Penali 
Tourists Tourists official arrivals per square kilometre (Tourists choosing 
official accommodations) - Year 2005 
Tourism ISTAT, Statistiche del 
Turismo 
Tourists_coast Tourist arrivals per square kilometre in coastal provinces with 
small-medium size cities (zero otherwise) 
Tourism Elaborations on ISTAT, 
Statistiche del Turismo 
Tourists_mount Tourist arrivals per square kilometre in mountain provinces with 
small-medium size cities (zero otherwise) 
Tourism Elaborations on ISTAT, 
Statistiche del Turismo 
Tourists_cityart Tourist arrivals  per  square kilometre in small- medium size art 
cities (zero otherwise) 
Tourism Elaborations on ISTAT, 
Statistiche del Turismo 
Tourists_bigmun Tourist arrivals per square kilometre in provinces with  big 
municipalities (zero otherwise)  
Tourism Elaborations on ISTAT, 
Statistiche del Turismo 
South Dummy variable: 1 if the province is located in the South of 
Italy;  zero otherwise. 
Dummy    
Bigmun Dummy variable: 1 if the province contains a big municipality 
(i.e. a town with more than 250,000 inhabitants); zero otherwise. 
Dummy   
 
 
Table 3A. Descriptive statistic of dependent variables 
Name Mean Median SD Min Max 
Pick-pocketing 251.91 156.74 294.74 11.50 1712.90 
Bag-snatching 31.07 18.02 39.14 0 279.57 
Car thefts 374.57 368.61 172.68 69.86 822.58 
Extortion 9.02 7.86 4.91 2.50 26.81 
Fraud 161.17 148.4 50.68 80.26 384.14 
Murder 1.01 0.74 1.10 0 6.92 
Organized crime 2.19 1.63 2.15 0 13.73 
Prostitution 3.00 2.68 1.94 0 8.44 
Robbery 44.68 30.93 51.61 8.32 407.76 
Theft in dwelling 346.96 348.88 148.79 72.64 737.62 




Table 3B. Descriptive statistic of explanatory variables 
Name Mean Median SD Min Max 
ValueAdded 17,276.11 18,247.43 4,297.92 9,704.03 28,026.42 
Unemployment 9.21 5.42 7.44 1.73 30.31 
Foreigner 3.95 4.12 2.27 0.61 8.58 
Density 241.56 170.60 328.36 36.61 2,613.04 
Diploma 2,402.72 2,427.12 235.65 1,860.73 3,101.87 
Unkown (Pick-pocketing) 0.97 0.98 0.03 0.84 1.00 
Unkown (Bag-snatching) 0.89 0.93 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Unkown (Car thefts) 0.94 0.96 0.04 0.74 0.99 
Unkown (Extortion) 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.81 
Unkown (Fraud) 0.41 0.42 0.16 0.02 0.91 
Unkown (Murder) 0.25 0.16 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Unkown (Organized crime) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Unkown (Prostitution) 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Unkown (Robbery) 0.64 0.64 0.12 0.28 0.94 
Unkown (Theft in dwelling) 0.94 0.95 0.02 0.85 0.98 
Unkown (Theft in shop) 0.82 0.82 0.07 0.52 0.98 
Tourists 375.51 192.50 663.34 23.15 5,111.68 
Tourists_coast 159.63 0.00 534.52 0.00 5,111.68 
Tourists_mount 50.06 0.00 143.08 0.00 834.93 
Tourists_cityart 61.32 0.00 168.02 0.00 1,208.21 
Tourists_bigmun 127.56 0.00 470.62 0.00 2,691.87 
South 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 











Table 4. Estimation results: crime offenses and tourism  
Crime offense (OLS) Tourism Coefficient Moran I Test 
(Spatial Lag Model) 
Tourism Coefficient 
(Spatial Error Model) 
Tourism Coefficient 
Bag-snatching 0.39^ -0.11 - - 
Car thefts 0.05 0.17*** 0.06^ 0.06^ 
Extortion 0.06 0.18*** 0.00^ 0.06^ 
Fraud 0.00 0.09* 0.00 0.01 
Murder 0.39 -0.07 - - 
Organized crime 0.43 -0.11 - - 
Pick-pocketing 0.20* 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
Prostitution 0.36 -0.20** 0.35 0.35^ 
Robbery 0.04 0.10** 0.04 0.07^ 
Theft in dwelling 0.04 0.14*** 0.05 0.05 
Theft in shop 0.06^ 0.19*** 0.06* 0.06* 
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithm of crime offences per 100,000 inhabitants. ^, *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 20%, 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; 
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Table 5. Estimation results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
















 Lag  
Model 
Spatial 
 Error  
Model 
ValueAdd 1.480** 1.538*** 1.572***    1.226*** 1.157*** 1.441*** 
 (0.622) (0.567) (0.566)    (0.419) (0.399) (0.419) 
Unemployment 0.231 0.260 0.209       
 (0.622) (0.161) (0.166)       
Foreigners 0.303* 0.262 0.295*       
 (0.177) (0.161) (0.162)       
Density 0.185** 0.155* 0.197**    0.216** 0.181** 0.239*** 
 (0.093) (0.086) (0.090)    (0.091) (0.086) (0.089) 
Diploma -0.213 -0.168 -0.194       
 (0.655) (0.597) (0.658)       
Unknown 0.518 0.596 0.973       
 (1.711) (1.563) (1.477)       
Tourists 0.204*** 0.209*** 0.205*** 0.654*** 0.520*** 0.518*** 0.218*** 0.228*** 0.217*** 
 (0.072) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.056) (0.057) (0.069) (0.065) (0.065) 
South -0.537*** -0.218 -0.442*    -0.710*** -0.361 -0.568** 
 (0.250) (0.250) (0.246)    (0.222) (0.232) (0.233) 
Big Municipality 0.545*** 0.580*** 0.506***    0.600*** 0.649*** 0.535*** 
 (0.191) (0.175) (0.166)    (0.180) (0.171) (0.163) 
Constant -10.399 -12.584* -11.485* 1.580*** -0.166 2.202*** -8.996** -9.595** -11.25*** 
 (7.075) (6.472) (6.433) (0.366) (0.467) (0.339) (4.103) (3.836) (4.081) 
p    0.252**     0.544***     0.252***   
   (0.098)     (0.090)     (0.096)   
λ     0.358***     0.611***     0.353*** 
     (0.113)     (0.082)     (0.113) 
Adj R2 0.755     0.470     0.754     
AIC   164.2 162.0   199.15 202.99   160.62 158.26 
Log Likelihood   -70.198 -68.998   -94.576 -97.493   -72.311 -71.129 
Breusch-Pagan  
test for htrskd.ty. 0.090 9.215st 12.742st 1.130 12.356st 1.273st 0.090 7.742st 10.307st * 
MORAN I TEST (Error) 5.391***     7.282***     3.858***     
LM Lag 8.417***     59.959***     11.176***     
RLM Lag 0.151     13.262***     3.250*     
LM Error 11.011***     48.074***     8.016***     
RLM Error 2.745*     1.377     0.090     
CFH test  2.984    5.833**     4.240     
LM Test residual 
 spatial autocorrelation   0.917     13.542***     1.009   
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithm of pick-pocketing offences per 100,000 inhabitants. All 
variables are expressed in log-level terms. The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; st indicates studentized Breusch-Pagan 
test for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 6. Estimation results: the geography of destinations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












 Error  
Model 
ValueAdd 1.626** 1.680*** 1.653*** 1.701*** 1.742*** 1.785*** 
 (0.617) (0.543) (0.539) (0.615) (0.540) (0.536) 
Unemployment 0.175 0.214 0.211 0.206 0.239 0.244 
 (0.175) (0.154) (0.160) (0.175) (0.154) (0.159) 
Foreigners 0.270 0.209 0.276* 0.255 0.198 0.244 
 (0.176) (0.156) (0.154) (0.175) (0.154) (0.152) 
Density 0.172* 0.140 0.165* 0.178* 0.146* 0.160* 
 (0.096) (0.085) (0.091) (0.096) (0.085) (0.090) 
Diploma -0.327 -0.304 -0.502 -0.281 -0.266 -0.571 
 (0.648) (0.571) (0.643) (0.644) (0.567) (0.636) 
Unknown 0.760 0.816 0.891 0.607 0.684 0.724 
 (1.703) (1.501) (1.376) (1.695) (1.489) (1.355) 
Tourists 0.161* 0.172** 0.165** 0.207** 0.211** 0.213*** 
 (0.092) (0.081) (0.076) (0.097) (0.085) (0.080) 
Tourists_cityArt 0.028 0.046** 0.066*** 0.024 0.042* 0.063*** 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) 
Tourists_coast 0.024 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.005 0.003 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.029) 
Tourists_mount -0.044 -0.055* -0.052* -0.051 -0.060** -0.061*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) 
Tourists_bigmun    -0.228 -0.194 -0.211* 
    (0.153) (0.135) (0.126) 
South -0.537** -0.165 -0.519** -0.535** -0.174 -0.512** 
 (0.247) (0.242) (0.241) (0.245) (0.826) (0.239) 
Big Municipality 0.677** 0.695*** 0.643*** 2.018** 1.839* 1.922** 
 (0.257) (0.226) (0.209) (0.938) (0.022) (0.775) 
Constant -10.550 -12.799** -9.545 -11.901* -13.886** 10.498* 
 (6.987) (6.184) (6.092) (7.000) (6.178) (6.027) 
P    0.303***     0.294***   
   (0.093)     (0.092)   
λ      0.462***     0.474*** 
     (0.102)     (0.100) 
Adj R2 0.761     0.764     
AIC   160.91 157.02   160.86 156.15 
Log Likelihood   -65.456 -63.508   -64.430 -62.074 
Breusch-Pagan  
Test for htrskd.ty. 1.110 17.548st 17.975st 2.29 17.584st 17.673st 
       
       
       
 27 
Table 6. ( cont inued)  
MORAN I TEST (Error) 12.552***     26.777**     
LM Lag 11.349***     10.480***     
RLM Lag 0.791     0.582     
LM Error 12.552***     12.460***     
RLM Error 1.994     2.562     
CFH test  26.263***    5.833    
LM Test residual  
spatial autocorrelation   0.997     1.658   
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithm of pick-pocketing offences per 100,000 
inhabitants. All variables are expressed in log-level terms. The standard errors are in 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; st 
indicates studentized Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 7. Estimation results: robust check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 




























ValueAdd 1.574** 1.506*** 1.476*** 1.593** 1.636*** 1.658*** 1.624*** 1.687*** 1.694*** 1.569** 1.615*** 1.696*** 
 (0.618) (0.559) (0.547) (0.618) (0.562) (0.568) (0.615) (0.556) (0.567) (0.618) (0.562) (0.562) 
Unemployment 0.178 0.265* 0.202 0.181 0.215 0.190 0.193 0.222 0.211 0.256 0.282* 0.233 
 (0.175) (0.159) (0.163) (0.175) (0.160) (0.166) (0.173) (0.157) (0.164) (0.174) (0.159) (0.165) 
Foreigners 0.307* 0.249 0.278* 0.311* 0.271 0.309* 0.264 0.221 0.284* 0.293* 0.255 0.271* 
 (0.174) (0.159) (0.157) (0.174) (0.159) (0.162) (0.174) (0.158) (0.160) (0.175) (0.159) (0.160) 
Density 0.204** 0.175** 0.221** 0.187** 0.159* 0.190** 0.144 0.113 0.152* 0.201** 0.171** 0.203** 
 (0.094) (0.086) (0.088) (0.092) (0.085) (0.090) (0.094) (0.086) (0.092) (0.093) (0.085) (0.089) 
Diploma -0.249 -0.189 -0.292 -0.228 -0.183 -0.213 -0.316 -0.272 -0.324 -0.156 0.119 -0.215 
 (0.648) (0.589) (0.651) (0.648) (0.589) (0.650) (0.646) (0.584) (0.650) (0.649) (0.591) (0.649) 
Unknown 0.484 0.412 0.697 0.614 0.678 0.973 0.941 1.032 1.196 0.292 0.390 0.738 
 (1.698) (1.546) (1.408) (1.693) (1.542) (1.476) (1.696) (1.533) (1.476) (1.700) (1.548) (1.459) 
Tourists 0.190** 0.189*** 0.173*** 0.134 0.146** 0.163** 0.222*** 0.227*** 0.220*** 0.229*** 0.231*** 0.234*** 
 (0.074) (0.067) (0.065) (0.081) (0.074) (0.074) (0.071) (0.064) (0.066) (0.073) (0.066) (0.067) 
Tourists_CityArt 0.019 0.036 0.053***          
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.020)          
Tourists_Coast    0.045* 0.040* 0.031       
    (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)       
Tourists_Mount       -0.054** -0.056** -0.043*    
       (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)    
Tourists_BigMun          -0.221* -0.224* -0.233* 
          (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) 
South -0.553** -0.202 -0.496** -0.534** -0.229 -0.448* -0.510** -0.182 -0.446* -0.541** -0.234 -0.443* 
 (0.251) (0.247) (0.247) (0.247) (0.247) (0.242) (0.246) (0.247) (0.241) (0.247) (0.247) (0.242) 
Big Municipalità 0.577*** 0.645*** 0.604*** 0.763*** 0.773*** 0.640*** 0.504*** 0.538*** 0.470*** 2.096** 1.966** 1.958** 
 (0.195) (0.176) (0.163) (0.226) (0.207) (0.197) (0.188) (0.171) (0.166) (0.947) (0.862) (0.832) 
Constant -10.71*** -12.31** -9.775 -11.073 -13.089** -11.995* -10.708 -12.96** -11.44* -11.960* -13.89** -12.73** 
 (7.015) (6.396) (6.227) (7.007) (6.393) (6.419) (6.960) (6.315) (6.365) (7.070) (6.449) (6.372) 
p    0.289***     0.241**     0.259***     0.242**   
   (0.096)     (0.098)     (0.096)     (0.096)   
λ      0.457***     0.331***     0.328***     0.364*** 
     (0.102)     (0.115)     (0.116)     (0.112) 
Adj R2 0.759     0.759     0.762     0.515     
AIC   164.03 158.33   163.49 162.56   161.23 161.32   163.74 160.88 
Log Likelihood   -69.015 -66.167   -68.746 -68.279   -67.613 -67.661   -68.868 -67.442 
Breusch-Pagan  
test for htrskd.ty. 1.130 13.594st 14.615st 0.70 13.718st 14.14st 0.43 16.24* st 1.273st 0.73 12.722st 12.442st 
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                               Table 7. ( cont inued)  
MORAN I TEST 
(Error) 4.492***     3.574***     3.675***     3.975***     
LM Lag 9.904***     7.909***     9.346***     7.732***     
RLM Lag 0.037     0.785     1.386     0.110     
LM Error 14.127***     8.118***     8.644***     10.648***     
RLM Error 4.261**     0.994     0.685     3.062*     
CFH test 14.948     6.790    5.423     2.934     
LM Test residual  
spatial autocorrelation   2.550     0.170     0.007     1.399   
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithm of pick-pocketing offences per 100,000 inhabitants. All variables are 
expressed in log-level terms. The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 































Figure 1. Estimated number of Pick-pocketing events (reported 
and unreported) per 10.000 inhabitants in the Italian provinces; 
year 2005. 
 
Source: elaboration on ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziare e penale (2005); and la Sicurezza dei Cittadini (2002). 
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